{"id":11381,"date":"2022-05-25T23:43:40","date_gmt":"2022-05-25T21:43:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.islamicworld.it\/wp\/?p=11381"},"modified":"2026-03-14T11:57:59","modified_gmt":"2026-03-14T10:57:59","slug":"tehran-towards-beijing-and-moscow-strategic-alliances-and-overcoming-divergences","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.islamicworld.it\/wp\/tehran-towards-beijing-and-moscow-strategic-alliances-and-overcoming-divergences\/","title":{"rendered":"TEHR\u0100N TOWARDS BEIJING AND MOSCOW: STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND OVERCOMING DIVERGENCES"},"content":{"rendered":"

by Glauco D\u2019Agostino<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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Belt and Road Initiative <\/strong><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

The crisis in Ukraine looks to have diverted the world’s attention away from Eastern geopolitical events. Yet, the East shapes the most remarkable changes in the global order. Following expulsion from Afghanistan, the White House’s most significant concern is the growing importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, given the Chinese-driven regional aggregation now includes Russia, Iran, and, above all, India. Washington voices opposition to the Chinese commercial ability, the Road and Belt Initiative and Russia’s imperial surge. Meanwhile, it fails to overcome even the vetoes at a resumption of the JCPOA negotiation with Iran and loses the solidarity from India involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in Asia. <\/em><\/span>Perhaps, the conflict in Ukraine has disclosed US isolation, which, in perspective, one could glimpse into the tiresome relationship with the Europe allied partners since the White House requires them to break off energy supplies from Moscow and veto the start of the Silk Road infrastructure projects.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

This analysis by Glauco D’Agostino, focused on the growing but not always easy relations among Tehr\u0101n, Beijing and Moscow, predates the Ukrainian crisis and was first published last February in “Geopolitica. Revist\u0103 de Geografie Politic\u0103, Geopolitic\u0103 \u015fi Geostrategie<\/a>,” Anul XX, nr. 92-93 (1 \/ 2022) “INFRASTRUCTURI CRITICE EMERGENTE – RISCURI GEOPOLITICE<\/a>.”<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Abstract:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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Iranian President Ebr\u0101h\u012bm Raisi, June 2019<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

If Tehr\u0101n today looks at Beijing and Moscow, the West can only regret itself short-sightedness in foreign policy. Iran\u2019s admission to the SCO breaks international isolation due to the US sanctions. The new Raisi\u2019s leadership and even the so-called \u201cmoderates\u201d have not ignored the problem, which risks bringing the nation to its knees. There is no doubt the American unilateral JCPOA withdrawal and its muscular use of force in the Middle East have prompted Iran to accentuate its geopolitical vision towards the East already there.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Islamic Republic has sure developed intense relationships with China and Russia. Tehr\u0101n looks with sizeable openness to the Belt and Road Initiative<\/em>, and trustfully at the strategic alliance with Moscow in the Middle East, even though problems do not lack, especially in the Caucasian area. In addition, Beijing and Moscow are JCPOA\u2019s partners and may play an important role in regaining nuclear talks. The mediation capacity of Chinese and Russian leadership centres on their flexibility. All that is also part of the US-China harsh dispute, which has its explicit exhibition in the Gulf and Indo-Pacific geostrategic theatres. India, Central Asia, Caucasus, Caspian, Middle East, including Israel are areas where China will be again a power mediating opposing interests. Iran, as well, will have to bear in mind that the Chinese non-interference policy excludes it can align with the logic of the blocks, also considering its good attitude toward Saudi Arabia, Emirates and Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n

The relations between the Islamic Republic and the Russian Federation are ambivalent and mainly concern the transport corridors crossing the Caucasus and Caspian. Iran may have both interests in keeping its axis with Armenia and Russia on the North-South Corridor and opening to Turkey and Azerbaijan on geostrategic grounds. Mutual distrust arises precisely from the uncertainty of the geopolitical framework and the mutability of alliances, which, outside the past ideological, are flexible and built on the 21st<\/sup>-century far-sighted parameters.<\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong> Iran, China, Russia, SCO, Belt and Road Initiative<\/em>, JCPOA, sanctions, transport corridors, non-interference, USA-China dispute, logic of the blocks, Indo-Pacific, Central Asia, Middle East, Caucasus, Caspian.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

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SCO Foreign Ministers Council in Dushanbe, July 13th<\/sup>-14th<\/sup>, 2021<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Iranian President Ebr\u0101h\u012bm Raisi with then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan at the Dushanbe\u2019s SCO Summit, September 16th<\/sup>, 2021<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

Access to the SCO and the US sanctions<\/strong><\/p>\n

On September 17th<\/sup>, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), when meeting in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, has given consent to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s entry as a permanent member. Now, a process for full membership will follow as for Pakistan and India, members since 2017.<\/p>\n

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Iranian former President Ma\u1e25m\u016bd A\u1e25madinej\u0101d<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

The decision rewards the perseverance of Iran (which has been an observer state since 2005) in pursuing its goal through a gradual diplomatic approach that has borne fruits. Since 2007, yet, Tehr\u0101n by President Ma\u1e25m\u016bd A\u1e25madinej\u0101d had been taking part in top-level multilateral meetings between the six countries (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) in 2001 founded this political, economic and security regional aggregation.[1]<\/a> In 2008, the first application for admission failed on the opposition of some states due to UN sanctions on nuclear power. The same occurred the following year at Tajikistan’s hands. The acceleration came when, in March 2020, Beijing and Tehr\u0101n announced a US$-400-billion agreement in Chinese investments in Iran over the next 25 years: it was the first visible opening towards Tehr\u0101n\u2019s acceptance into the SCO.[2]<\/a> Exactly one year later, that agreement formalised as a global strategic partnership with particular regard to the energy, infrastructure and technology sectors.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

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SCO Summit in Bishkek, June 14th<\/sup>, 2019<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

The SCO, which replaces the 1996 Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions (Shanghai Group), brings together eight countries that today represent 40% of the world population, 20% of the global GDP and 60% of the Euro-Asian continental area.[4]<\/a> Beijing sees it as an instrument of multilateralism and an expression of the non-interference political will it employs in international politics in the world.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

The new Iranian President Ebr\u0101h\u012bm Raisi seems to think so. Addressing the SCO leaders, according to The Jerusalem Post <\/em>reports, he said: \u201cThe world has entered a new era. Hegemony and unilateralism have failed \u2026 The international balance from now on leans towards multilateralism and the redistribution of powers towards independent countries. Unilateral sanctions don\u2019t uniquely target one country. It has become evident that, in recent years, they affect more the independent countries, especially SCO members.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister \u2018Al\u012b Bagheri Kani, chief negotiator in Vienna JCPOA talks<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

On the Iranian side, the issue seems to revolve around the international isolation Tehr\u0101n has been forced to by the US sanctions imposed by Trump and confirmed by Biden. Admission to the SCO breaks this isolation, giving it new strength to withstand Western pressure. Undoubtedly, the new Raisi\u2019s leadership and the so-called \u201chardliners\u201d eased the embrace with Beijing. But even the so-called \u201cmoderates\u201d could not in the past and cannot today ignore the problem of isolation and \u201cunlawful and inhumane\u201d[6]<\/a> sanctions, which risk bringing the nation to its knees. The US foreign policy fickleness has caused bewilderment among the Iranians, has embarrassed the Ruhani Presidency, and made the continuing US squeeze on Iran appear like a dangerous noose around its neck. After all, President Ruhani, which signed and managed the comprehensive strategic partnership with Beijing, has shown the inevitability of this decision, especially after General Sulaim\u0101n\u012b\u2019s meaningless assassination.<\/p>\n

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January 2016 meeting \u1e24asan Ruhani-Xi Jinping Presidents <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

To what extent is this Iranian policy process merely a result of its anger toward Washington or, instead, a systematic strategy of alliance with the Asian giants, China and Russia? Probably, neither of these extreme hypotheses. But there is no doubt the American unilateral JCPOA withdrawal and its muscular use of force in the Middle East have prompted Tehr\u0101n to accentuate its geopolitical vision towards the East already there. On the other hand, the launch of the ten-year agreement on the trade expansion between Iran and China dates to 2016, during the Tehr\u0101n Xi Jinping-Ruhani meeting.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n

The Islamic Republic has sure developed intense relationships with China and Russia, which, as well, are affected by US sanctions. As a matter of priority, Tehr\u0101n looks with sizeable openness to the Belt and Road Initiative<\/em> and the resulting billionaire contracts that will allow it to adapt its troubled infrastructural and commercial networks. And it looks with confidence at the strategic alliance with Moscow in the Middle East cemented by Ba\u0161\u0161ar al-Asad\u2019s joint defence, even though problems do not lack, especially in the Caucasian area. In addition, Beijing and Moscow are JCPOA\u2019s partners and may play an important role in regaining nuclear talks that already started on November 29th<\/sup>. Here a picture of Iran-China and Iran-Russia bilateral problems is outlined in the more complex sphere of geopolitical games.<\/p>\n

The Silk Road and \u201cMarine Security Belt\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Ancient Silk Road (by Kelvin Case, 2010)<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

The Belt and Road Initiative<\/em>, announced in September 2013, has now an intercontinental scope as it is part of the issue of controlling commercial traffic between Asia, Europe and Africa, both by land and sea. In the former case, the routes involve Central Asia, Iran and the Middle East, to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean; in the latter, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, from Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Indochina, the Indian sub-continent, to the Arabian Peninsula, Europe and East Africa, and embroiling the bottlenecks of Malacca, Hormuz, B\u0101b al-Mandeb and Suez Straits. Therefore, one can understand the Chinese interest in involving Iran as a primary strategic partner in the western initiative segment. Iran has both continental and maritime nature, such as welcoming traffic from Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific to convey it to the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa: a proper service transport hub featured as an energy-producing country, worthwhile to China, as well, for propelling its industry and trade expansion.<\/p>\n

In September, Javad Owji, the Raisi government\u2019s new oil Minister, said plans over the next 4-8 years were underway to attract US$ 145 billion from Iranian and foreign investors (likely Chinese, Russian and Indian). The budget includes the first share of the global strategic partnership signed with China, which for the next 25 years will allocate US$ 280 billion to Iran for the development of the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; and the remaining 120 to upgrade the transport and production infrastructures. Displaying Iran\u2019s interest in the partnership, the Minister added: \u201cIran is ready to cooperate fully with Chinese companies to develop oil industry projects in the upstream and downstream sectors\u2026We expect the administration to have many partnerships and agreements between Iran and China\u201d (Watkins, 2021).<\/p>\n

For its part, China as well looks to the Islamic Republic with confidence while taking into account its following characteristics:<\/p>\n